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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 16-1250 
_____________ 
In re: JOSEPH P. MAUZ, 
      Debtor 
WILLIAM LINK; KIMBERLY LINK 
v. 
JOSEPH P. MAUZ, 
      Appellant 
______________ 
On Appeal from the Order of the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 1-15-cv-01363) 
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III 
______________ 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 19, 2016 
______________ 
Before: MCKEE,* HARDIMAN, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
(Opinion Filed:  January 13, 2017) 
_______________________ 
OPINION** 
______________________
* Chief Judge Theodore A. McKee’s term as Chief Judge ended on September 30, 2016.
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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MCKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Joseph Mauz appeals the District Court’s order affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s 
decision holding Mauz’s $217,100 debt owed to Appellees William and Kimberly Link 
not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) because it arose from a willful and 
malicious injury. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the ruling of the District 
Court. 
I. 
This case arises from ongoing hostility between Mauz and the Links, who were 
adjoining property owners. Over the years, Mauz filed ten complaints against the Links in 
state court. Each was either dismissed, withdrawn, or resulted in a finding of not guilty. 
Mauz also made over thirty complaints against the Links with the local police department 
and various municipal offices. None of these complaints resulted in charges against the 
Links. In an apparent attempt to halt Mauz’s persistent conduct, the Links sued Mauz in 
the Court of Common Pleas of York County for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. After a bench trial, the Links were awarded $217,000 in damages. 
Mauz countered by filing a Chapter 7 petition for voluntary bankruptcy.  While 
Mauz’s bankruptcy proceedings were pending, the Links commenced an Adversary 
Proceeding against Mauz, in which they argued that Mauz could not discharge the state 
court judgment because it was based on a finding of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The Bankruptcy Court and the District Court agreed with the Links and held that 
Mauz’s debt to the Links was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Mauz 
appealed. 
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II. 
The Bankruptcy Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the initial proceedings 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(1).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s appellate review of the Bankruptcy Court’s 
decision and exercise the same standard of review as the District Court in reviewing the 
Bankruptcy Court’s determinations.2 We review a bankruptcy court’s legal 
determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error.3 Factual findings may only 
be overturned “if they are completely devoid of credible evidentiary basis or bear no 
rational relationship to the supporting data.”4 However, determining dischargeability of a 
debt arising from willful and malicious injury is a question of law.5 
III. 
 Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge “any debt” accrued 
“for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another 
entity.”6 “An injury is willful and malicious under the Code only if the actor purposefully 
                                              
2 In re Winstar Commc’ns, Inc., 554 F.3d 382, 389 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009). 
3 In re Michael, 699 F.3d 305, 308 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Goody’s Family 
Clothing Inc., 610 F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
4 In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 444 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Citicorp 
Venture Capital, Ltd. v. Comm. of Creditors, 323 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2003) (alteration 
omitted).  
5 In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003). 
6 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 
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inflicted the injury or acted with substantial certainty that the injury would result.”7 A 
creditor must prove a willful and malicious injury by a preponderance of the evidence.8 
 Here, the Bankruptcy Court determined in a succinct and well-reasoned opinion 
that Mauz’s “outrageous” number of “spurious” complaints caused emotional and 
physical injury to the Links and their property and that Mauz had acted willfully with the 
purpose of injuring the Links.9  The District Court agreed,10 and wisely declined to list 
Mauz’s abuses yet again. Instead, the District Court explained: “[w]hile we could, as [the 
bankruptcy judge] did in his Opinion, list the litany of abuses foisted on the Links by 
Mauz, we frankly find it a waste of judicial resources to spill any further ink on Mauz’s 
meritless contentions.”11   
Having reviewed the record, we agree that it is a “waste of judicial resources to 
spill any further ink on Mauz’s meritless contentions,” and we will therefore affirm the 
judgment of the District Court substantially for the reasons set forth in the Court’s well-
reasoned opinion.  
IV.  
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the decision of the District Court. 
                                              
7 In re Conte, 33 F.3d 303, 305 (3d Cir. 1994).  
8 In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 626 (3d Cir. 1990).  
9 In re Mauz, 532 B.R. 589, 594–98 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2015). 
10 Although Mauz goes to excruciating lengths to manufacture eleven claims of error in 
his appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s order, the District Court concluded that Mauz is 
only raising one claim of error: that the Bankruptcy Court erred in determining that 
Mauz’s debt was nondischargeable because it arose from a willful and malicious injury. 
Because we agree with the District Court’s characterization of Mauz’s claim, this is the 
only error we consider on appeal. 
11 Mauz v. Link, No. 1:15-CV-1363, 2016 WL 108065, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2016).  
